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Quite regardless of whether I agree with the recommendations made, the
work done by this Committee is entitled to the highest possible commendation. It
is thorough and exhaustive. It is easily superior to any report ever made in the
field. It furnishes to any one who desires to be informed with respect to it,
reference to all the literature upon the subject. As is generally the case, one
member of the Committee did the major part of the work. He was well qualified
both by experience and learning. I have had the benefit not merely of the discussion of the recommendations but of Mr. Sylvester's personal review upon the
report. When I made known to him what I had undertaken to do, he not only
offered to be, but has been, most helpful in furnishing material.
The recommendations of the Committee will be discussed in order.
TATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS.

I. Right of the Defendant in a Criminal Case to Waive Trial by Jury
That the defendant should have this right, if he is of sound mind, is not
open to question. If the prosecution is content to go to trial without a jury and
the defendant so desires, why should anyone object? Who could complain?
Who, besides these two parties, is interested? I do not agree, however, that a
trial is necessarily more speedy, more dignified, nor more accurate in result without a jury than with one. I cannot believe, for instance, that the trial of Leopold
and Loeb in Chicago could have occupied more time with a jury than it did
without. The time consumed in the summation alone in that case was more than
the trial could possibly have taken had it been conducted, according to rules of
procedure, with a jury. A trial ought to be much more brief without a jury than
with one. Nor is it at all certain that the result would not have been more accurate. I do not believe that waiving a jury is an indication that the defendant
believes himself innocent, nor that it gives the defendant the opportunity of
avoiding the prejudicial effect on the jurors' verdict of sensational newspaper
publicity. An accurate survey of juries' verdicts, where there was sensational
publicity, indicating a desire on the part of the united press that the jury should
render a verdict of guilty, will show that in most instances a verdict of acquittal
was rendered. Instances: Samuel Insull, Martin Insull, Charles E. Mitchell,
George L. Rickard, Isaac Harris and Max Blanck, and Raymond Hitchcock.
These are but a few of hundreds; in these the publicity was so pronouncedly
against the defendant that it was believed in the community in which the trials
took place that the defendant could not obtain a fair trial. On the other hand, I
think it is a great mistake on the part of the defendant in these days to believe
that he can benefit by emotional appeals to the jury because of favorable newspaper publicity.
It would be distressing to think that any prosecutor would enter into a trade
to induce a defendant to waive a jury trial in exchange for his accepting a plea
to a lesser offense. I prefer to believe that such arrangements are made in the
interest of justice. I regret that the Committee thought it will "render possible
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corrupt dealings between criminals and various individual judges". If there are
such judges in any quantity, I would nevertheless not be opposed to permitting
the waiver, so that the judges who saw fit to enter into bargains of that character
should have the opportunity to do so, because sooner or later they would be
detected; it is of inestimable importance to rid the bench of even one such man.
The conclusion of the Committee appeals to me as being entirely sound.
The reasons given for it in this instance might very well have been omitted.
II. The Less Than Unanimous Jury Verdict
The recommendation is that in criminal cases the conclusion as to guilt or
innocence, when arrived at by ten of the jurors out of twelve, should be sufficient
basis for a verdict. I concur in that conclusion. I fail to see, however, why it
should be limited to criminal cases. The trend has been to deprive the accused
in a criminal case of rights or privileges that have been accorded him in the past.
The impression has been created that it is very difficult to convict and that technicalities stand in the way of the prosecutor. I know of nobody who has not
been constantly on the prosecution's side, who has had experience in criminal
cases that shares such a view. Every juror is asked whether the fact that the
defendant has been indicted in any way influences him or her to the belief that
the defendant is guilty, and each juror says, "No"; but in truth the only person
on a jury who would not be influenced in that way is one who has himself or
herself been indicted and acquitted. The law is, in every state in the Union, that
the defendant is presumed to be innocent until it is proved to the contrary beyond
a reasonable doubt; actually, with nine jurors out of ten the defendant is presumed to be guilty until he has established his innocence. As the result of actual
experience on both sides, I am convinced that to talk about the difficulties that
beset the prosecutor when he has a real case is to indulge in nonsense. The
difficulties of the defendant cannot be exaggerated. Why the liberty of the
citizen should be held cheaper than dollars, it is difficult to understand. If ten
out of tvelve jurors can determine that a man should be deprived of his liberty,
why cannot ten out of twelve jurors determine that the defendant owes the
plaintiff some dollars or that he does not? The recommendation should be
adopted to apply in all cases.
III. Selection of Jurors by Trial Judges
The trial judge is in no position to select efficiently a jury for either side.
He knows nothing of the facts in the case. What is much more important is that
he knows nothing of the parties. The attorney knows the party and the witnesses on his side at least. Frequently he knows something of the opposite party,
his adversary and the witnesses. Such information is essential in the selection
of a jury. The attorney knows the facts, not merely the conclusions as they are
disclosed in the pleadings. He knows what is to be controverted, not merely the
statement of the controversy as it appears in the pleadings which, in most cases,
have not been read by the judge when he proceeds to select the jury. As a matter
of fact, the selection of the jury in those instances where the judge proceeds to
do so amounts to absolutely nothing. He inquires whether the jurors know the
parties and the counsel, and adopts and reads to the jurors a question or several
questions submitted by counsel. Lawyers generally have reached the conclusion
that this perfunctory performance is useless; I have yet to see an instance where
a lawyer submitted questions to the judge to be asked. To the trial counsel, the
examination of talesmen is as important as any other part of the trial, if not more
so. For illustration, I wish to call attention to what occurred in two recent
prosecutions. The examination of talesmen was conducted by counsel and not
by the court. It was a searching investigation on both sides, as it should have
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been. In one instance, it was concluded on a Thursday evening. The court and
both counsel started under a grave handicap. Each had a severe cold. The
conclusion of the examination of jurors was at about seven in the evening. The
case was adjourned to begin taking testimony on Monday. By Monday morning
there was indisputable evidence that some of the jurors had failed to answer very
material questions truthfully. From the answers that those jurors made, it
became perfectly evident that they knew that if they told the truth, they would
not be acceptable as jurors. It is not too drastic to say that they intended from
the very outset to favor one side or the other and that they had already formed
a conclusion that no evidence would change. The prosecutor and defendant's
counsel were dissatisfied with a number of those that had been accepted. Each
juror was informed clearly that if he had made any applications for loans to a
certain bank and was refused, he would not be acceptable to the defense; if
granted, he would not be acceptable to the prosecution. One of the jurors had
been refused not only once but three times in that bank. The suggestion might
here be made that the juror could have avoided disclosing the fact if the inquiry
had been conducted by the court. The difference is this: the question would
probably never have been asked by the court. The court is often not in a position
to know that such an inquiry would prove of the utmost importance to the prosecution or to the defense and there would have been no occasion for the juror
to disclose the facts, whereas in the manner in which this inquiry was conducted,
the juror had no excuse for not having disclosed them.
In the second instance which I have in mind, each juror was asked by counsel for the defense whether he was a depositor or a stockholder in a certain
institution. After the jury had been accepted, on the following day the defense
counsel produced indisputable evidence that one of the jurors was either a stockholder or a depositor in that institution. In that instance, had the court conducted
the inquiry of the jurors, that question might not have been asked. In these
instances, which came within my personal experience-in one instance representing the defendant; in the other the- prosecuticn-the liberty of the defendant
would have been gravely endangered if the examination had been conducted by
the court. These examples are not the exception. In examining the jurors, counsel
has the opportunity of hearing the juror's voice to observe his reaction to the
question. One inquiry leads to another from which both sides have the opportunity of reaching a conclusion as to whether the talesman would make a satisfactory juror. Of course, even then, many mistakes are made but it is the best
process that has been devised for ascertaining whether the individual is ixipartial
and is there only to do justice.
When the court conducts the inquiry, the jurors are jointly interrogated.
The ordinary juror does not treat the question as being addressed to him alone.
He regards the investigation as most informal-as it really is-as a sort of necessary but very perfunctory matter, whereas the examination of talesmen is a vital
matter in any kind of trial. The all-important thing which suggests this change
seems to be to save a few minutes. justice really does not seem to matter. When
judges were given the exclusive right to select jurors a terrific blow was struck at
fair trial.
The recommendation of the Committee is rather two-sided:
"Eliminating the right of the defendant to select the jury deprives him
of one of his most effective weapons and at the same time considerably
expedites the trial."
The word "weapon" in that sentence could only connote opportunity for obtaining a fair trial. So, there is a choice-Should the parties have a fair trial or
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should the trial be expedited, and, of course, the decision must be in favor of
expedition. The recommendation in this regard merely adopts the present trend
-speed, speed, nothing but speed. It should be rejected, and wherever the power
now exists, it should be withdrawn. In so-called important cases, even in tribunals where the judge has the right to select the jury, he does not exercise it. Why
is one case more important than another? To the defendant on trial, his case is
the most important, as indeed it should be to the prosecution. The rights and
privileges of all defendants should be alike.
IV. Authority of the Appellate Court to Modify Judgments in Accordance With
the Proof Where a Lesser Crime Than That ChargedHas Been Proved
Here it is presupposed that at the trial the defendant was convicted of a
crime that he did not commit. At the trial, he could and should have been convicted of a lesser crime. Should the appellate tribunal send the case back to have
the unnecessary task performed of trying him over again to prove him guilty of
the crime of which he has already been proved guilty? The answer is necessarily
no. The purpose of appellate tribunals is to rectify the errors of the court below.
The modification of the judgment and the substitution of a conviction for the
lesser crime of which the defendant was proved guilty are precisely the functions
the appellate tribunal was organized to perform.
V. Waiver, Limitation or Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment
The two branches of this proposal should be treated separately. That the
defendant should be permitted to waive indictment, if he is advised as to the
effect of his action, seems to be obvious. Anything that the defendant and prosecution jointly wish to do, they should be permitted to do. The assumption should
always be that the prosecutor is acting in good faith and is protecting the rights
of the Government as well as those of the defendant. When the defendant is
advised of his rights and wishes to waive any of them and the prosecution is
satisfied that no injustice can result to its cause, any procedure that will save
time and expense should be adopted.
The abolition of the grand jury would be a step backward. No one has ever
suggested a method of inquiry or a body to carry it on that is more desirable than
the grand jury. That some inquisitorial body should function is essential. It is
difficult to understand, but the fact remains that no matter how honorable a
prosecutor is, he is not long in office before he begins to believe that everybody
accused is guilty. Or, at least, he adopts the view that to accuse him and put him
to trial will actually do little harm. Incidentally, a most remarkable transformation
always occurs as soon as the prosecutor leaves office. For the first year or two
he is frequently retained by defendants because of his supposed familiarity with
the law and the functioning of the prosecutor's office. These ex-prosecutors
become virulent in their abuse of the prosecutor's methods though they are often
much more mild and commendable than were those of the man who is now
complaining.
There is no occasion, however, for bringing to the attention of the grand jury
petty or minor offenses. Felonies only should be submitted to their investigation.
If, in a rare instance, a misdemeanor is of serious import, provision should be
made for application to the appropriate court that in that particular instance the
matter should be submitted to the grand jury. Under existing statutes the
prosecutor has the privilege of submitting a misdemeanor to the grand jury. This
privilege ought to be removed. When either side deems the case to be of such
great importance that it should be submitted to a grand jury, provision should be
made for an application to the court for leave so to do and the court alone should
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have the right to determine whether in a particular instance the application should
be granted. The Committee's conclusion should be approved.
VI. Addition to the Summary Jurisdiction of Magistrates
The Committee disapproved this recommendation. Here speed and cost,
and improvement in the administration of the law are disregarded. The reason
is: "The criticism to which magistrates as a class have been subjected in recent
months renders dubious any suggestion to add to their jurisdiction."
A few individuals have been subjected to criticism-very few indeed. Even
if all the magistrates had been subjected to criticism, if. the criticism was unfounded, that would hardly be a ground for not making a great improvement in
the administration of justice which, obviously, the granting of additional summary jurisdiction to magistrates would accomplish. If the criticism is well
founded, a method is provided for their very expeditious removal. It has recently been invoked. Nobody has been heard to say that the method was not
sufficiently effective. The power to remove is, in New York, lodged in the
Appellate Division. I am sure that no one questions its integrity. In every other
jurisdiction, the power to remove is lodged in a responsible body. Why should
the fact that a few individuals have been criticized and two or three were found
guilty of that for which they were criticized, and were compelled to resign or
were removed, be a reason for withholding from magistrates summary jurisdiction over petty offenses? The fact is that they now have jurisdiction over some
crimes for which serious penalties are very frequently imposed. Jostling (which,
as I understand it, is a crime committed by several individuals in a crowd in
shoving one person against another so as to afford them the opportunity of picking
pockets) is an offense over which a magistrate has summary jurisdiction and for
which the defendants, found guilty, frequently are sentenced to six months in
prison. And yet, over such a thing as dealing in policy, or being possessed of
policy slips, the magistrate does not have sununary jurisdiction. If he can be
trusted in the one case, why not in the other? Here would be an actual saving
in time. And the defendants seem to be much more afraid of the magistrate than
they are of the ultimate tribunal, -because in nine cases out of ten they waive
examination before the magistrate. If there is such an examination, the magistrate is powerless to do more than to hold them for trial in Special Sessions. If
the experiences of these policy dealers had not been unsatisfactory before magistrates, they would plead guilty and not demand the opportunity to go to trial in
the Court of Special Sessions. In such a case the magistrate cannot even accept
a plea of guilty. Every argument is in favor of extension of the jurisdiction.
The recommendation should have been approved.
VII. Grant of Rule-Making Authority to the Criminal Courts
This recommendation is disapproved by the Committee. Apparently, it is
believed that the legislature, the majority of the membership of which always
consists of lawyers who are in large measure guided in their determination by the
best interests of their clients, is in a much better position to make wholesome rules
than are the experienced judges of. the courts, who in reality write the law.
These rules of procedure, most of which are archaic, were all mainly proposed
by men who were interested in the defense because they thought people were
unduly persecuted. In the period when they were conceived, that undoubtedly
was the fact. It was necessary to have rules to protect one against the Crown.
That day has long since passed. In the recommendation, the Committee says:
"Irrespective of the merits of these proposals, it is at least doubtful
whether they do not involve considerations of public policy and expediency
which should be determined by the legislature."
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If the proposals, I say, are meritorious, they should be adopted the more readily
because they do involve considerations of public policy and expediency. The
legislature is surely not more capable than the judges in determining considerations of public policy or expediency with respect to what is or is not appropriate
procedure in the courts. The recommendation, in my judgment, should have
been approved.
VIII. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
IX. Right of Comment on the Failure of a Defendant to Testify in a Criminal
Case
These two recommendations might well be treated together. I do not find
any recommendation of the Committee with respect to "VIII". The argument
made is entirely favorable to its approval. By decision in the federal courts, the
privilege against self-incrimination has been made an empty shell. It really
amounts to this-that the defendant cannot be called as a witness by the prosecution. How many instances are there where the defendant would be called as a
witness at the trial by the prosecution? The party that calls a witness is bound
by his answers. The instance, indeed, is rare where the prosecutor would be
willing to be bound by the answers of the defendant. This privilege against selfincrimination is exercised much more often in civil cases than in criminal. The
instances are very rare in which a defendant fails to take the witness stand and
nevertheless earns an acquittal. In such cases, it is not because the defendant
did not testify that he is acquitted. It is because the prosecution really had no
case and the defendant did not voluntarily go on the stand to make one for the
People. If the Government has a case and the defendant fails to take the stand,
the reason ascribed for that conduct by the jury is that the defendant concedes
his guilt and the verdict is in accordance with it. If the jury overlooked the fact
that the defendant failed to take the stand, it is only because it recognized that
there was nothing which the prosecution proved which required explanation. It
would be in the interest of justice to abolish the privilege. In my opinion it
would help both the prosecution and the defendant. While the privilege exists,
the defendant and his attorney debate, in almost every case, whether the defendant
should take the stand or not. The counsel informs the defendant that the prosecution will have no right to comment upon his failure to take the stand. No
sensible reason has ever been furnished for depriving the prosecution of the right
to comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand. The prosecution can use
every kind of argument, sensible or otherwise, without restraint, but he may not
comment on what is vital. Why should he not be permitted to tell the jury that
the defendant has the right to take the stand? The defendant, who knows more
than anyone else can possibly know about the transaction in issue and about his
intentions to commit a crime or otherwise, has refrained from going on the stand
to tell the jury the part that he played. There can only be two reasons. The
prosecution may have failed to prove any case and there is therefore no necessity
for explanation. If the jury believes that, the reason is sound. The only other
excuse for not taking the stand is that if he did so, his guilt would be all the more
clear. A fair prosecutor would say, if there is nothing that I have established
that the defendant ought to meet, he is justified in refraining from taking the
stand, but have I not established thus and so; is not the defendant peculiarly the
individual who could have disproved that, if it can be disproved at all? Having
it in his power, he failed to do it. What motive impelled him to refrain? Why
should he not be permitted to make any argument that the proved circumstances
justify? And what is better proof in the case than the fact that the man who is
sitting here accused, who has been here throughout the trial, who heard all the
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testimony, who is more interested than any other individual can possibly be, has
deliberately refrained from exercising a privilege which is his? Both recommendations should have been approved. The reasons given for recommending
the ninth apply, with equal force, to the eighth, and those which apply to the
eighth are equally strong in favor of the ninth.
X. Right of the Trial Court to Comnent on the Evidence and on the Credibility
of Witnesses
Here again, I find no recommendation by the Committee, but the argument
seems to be- favorable to it. Trial by jury might well be abolished if that privilege is conferred upon and exercised by the trial court. In my own experience,
it has never been exercised. In the state courts of New York, no such privilege
exists. In the federal courts, however, within the various districts of the State,
the privilege does exist, and in the cases which I have tried in the federal court,
not once has the privilege been exercised. It seems to me that the sole reason
was that the court recognized how unfair it would be to the defendant and that
the function of the jury would thereby be practically abolished. If such a privilege were to be exercised by the judge presiding, it becomes incumbent upon
counsel for the defendant, in rebutting the judge's remarks, practically to insult
the sitting judge and thereby incur at least his displeasure and, in most instances,
unless it be most artfully done, the displeasure of the jury. Why should the
defendant's counsel be put in the position of guessing what comments the judge
is going to make on the testimony? The judge may intend to make none. The
anticipatory remarks of counsel would probably prove most hurtful, if he thought
that the judge was going to say: "I do not believe Mr. Jones, the witness for the
defendant; I do not believe the testimony of the defendant; my experience on
the bench has been such that of necessity I gauge with considerable accuracy the
frankness or lack thereof, the veracity or lack thereof, of witnesses; and, based
upon that experience over this long period in which I have observed the demeanor
of hundreds or thousands of witnesses, from that wealth of experience, I tell you
that the witness so and so is unworthy of belief". The jury must reach the
conclusion that the judge is either a liar or a jackass, or both, in order to disregard the effect of those comments. That result is not to be expected. What a
terrible thing it would be if we were to assume that the jury held the judge in
such contempt. Therefore, it simply means that in any case where the judge
desires to convict the defendant, he would make his comments accordingly. In a
case where he desires him to be acquitted, his comments would run favorable to
that conclusion. Then, why have a jury? Why discommode citizens? Why
take up time? Just abolish the jury in criminal cases. Hold that they are unnecessary where the liberty of the citizen is involved but, of course, they are indispensable where a controversy over a few dollars is waging. Personally, I would
much rather try a case before a judge alone, than before a judge with a jury if
the judge intended to comment on the guilt or innocence of the defendant or
credibility of witnesses. He might ease his conscience in a case where the jury
decided in favor of guilt, even though the testimony was not very persuasive,
because after all he did not decide. So, he would tell himself. But if he had to
bear the responsibility for the determination reached, he would pause, despite
himself, to make sure that the defendant was receiving the benefit of a fair trial.
I say it is to the glory and the honor of the federal judges, where they have this
privilege, that they so rarely exercise it. In my opinion, no good or strong judge
would exercise the privilege except in cases of clear guilt, where no wrong could
be done to the defendant, and the possibility of disagreement by the jury would
be obviated as the result of the comments. We must bear in mind, unfortunately,
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that not all judges are good and strong judges. If they were, the discussion
would be unimportant.
The recommendation should be opposed to this extra grant of power where
it is not already possessed, and the power should be taken away where it now
exists.
XI. Admissibility of PriorConvictions on the Prosecution'sDirect Case
The Committee disapproves the proposal. It is clear that the Committee's
judgment is wisely exercised. The fact that a man has committed an offense in
no way tends to prove that he has committed the one with which he is now
charged. With a jury it has much stronger probative force than it should have.
It should be excluded from the prosecution's case because it has no material
bearing upon the question in issue. It is an attempt to divert the jury from passing upon the question before it. On the other hand, if the privilege of selfincrimination and comment on the fact that the defendant has not taken the stand
are both removed, a very fair result follows; if the defendant determines to go
upon the stand, he is then tendering the issue of his credibility. Upon that issue,
it is perfectly fair that prior criminal conduct on his part should be weighed by
the jury in determining what credit they should give his evidence. That rule
applies to every witness. There should be no different rule in favor of or
against a defendant than there is in favor of or against any witness. All persons
who take the stand should be treated alike. If, on the other hand, the defendant
does not take the stand, the right to comment on that fact will more than make up
for the failure to prove prior conviction. But before the defendant has interposed
his defense or taken the stand, before he asks the jury to believe his spoken word,
the prior conviction has no bearing upon the commission of the instant crime.
The proposal should be rejected.
XII. Abolition of Mandatory Jury Exemptions
The Committee has recommended a very wise decision upon this proposal.
Its argument is perfect. Nothing should be taken from it and nothing can be
added to it. The proposal in the form recommended by it should be adopted.'
XIII. Notice of Defendant's Intent to Offer a Defense of Alibi or Insanity
The Committee has approved the proposal, and shows that it has considered
every reason for it and which might be suggested against it. Every consideration
of justice recommends it.
XIV. Impeachment by a Party of a Witness Called on His Behalf
The Committee approved the proposal. It points out that some objection to
it might, in rare instances, exist but it makes very clear that the interest of justice
requires its approval. The reasons assigned by the Committee are most persuasive. The objections to it are not entitled to much consideration. The proposal
should be adopted.
XV. Admissibility of Evidence of a Previous Identification
The proposal is approved by the Committee. I regret to say that I cannot
agree with the Committee's reasoning. Its suggestion is that if a witness who
has once identified an individual pretends a sudden loss of memory or cannot, at
the instant trial, identify the accused because of a change of appearance, then it
should be permitted to be shown that on a previous occasion he did identify the
i. The Committee recommended adoption of the proposal abolishing mandatory jury exemptions other than those granted to physicians and lawyers. With the exception of these
two classes, it was recommended that exemptions be left to the court's discretion.
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defendant, and that should be shown merely by witnesses who know nothing
about the identity of the defendant but simply say that Jones did, on a prior occasion, identify him. If Jones lied the first time and does not want to repeat his lie
the second time, then Smith should be called to say Jones identified the defendant,
and the jury is not informed as to why Jones does not identify him now. This
reasoning does not require further analysis. The practice would be vicious. The
second jury would learn that the identification was acceptable to a former jury
upon a different trial. The verdict of the prior jury would be substituted for
that of the second. One cannot enumerate all the reasons why such a rule
should not be adopted. There are instances where testimony given at a prior
trial, upon the same issue, can be read into evidence-if the witness is outside the
jurisdiction and cannot be reached, if the witness died and opportunity was
afforded at the first trial for complete cross-examination. But where the witness
is alive and available, not to require the witness to be produced and subjected to
cross-examination, but to permit somebody else who happened to be in the courtroom to go on the stand and venture his recollection that on a prior occasion
somebody identified this defendant, opens the door for testimony of the most
dangerous character and it is opposed to every rule of evidence that has heretofore been recognized as sound. Why every innovation against the defendant?
Why does not somebody suggest that the defendant should be permitted to offer
hearsay testimony in his behalf ? The answer suggests itself-let us have all the
prosecution possible and deprive the defendant of his liberty by any means that
can be conceived. This may seem severe stricture but I think there should be a
stronger tendency to protect the liberty of the citizen than to destroy it.
XVI. Perjury
The use of the word "perjury;' as a reform proposal or recommendation is
not very suggestive or instructive. We learn from the discussion of the recommendation that it implies a proposal that a crime denominated "false swearing"
should be created and that upon the trial the prosecution should not be called upon
to prove that the false swearing was material to the issue which was being contested.
Ordinarily, false swearing which is not upon a relevant matter is like lying.
Many doubt that the oath adds any sanctity to the utterance of the witness. The
belief is entertained by such that a person who would falsify, not being under oath,
would equally falsify being under oath. I have often believed both ways. It is
the regrettable fact that perjury is very frequently committed. It is doubtless
wrong to swear falsely at any place or under any circumstances, but it is particularly so in a court of justice. There is no very strong reason why that should
not be condemned even to the extent of making it a crime. It would doubtless
minimize the amount of perjury committed, and that alone should be sufficient
reason for the approval of the recommendation.
XVII. "Trial by Newspaper": Power to Punish for Contempt
The Committee failed to state that this proposal is approved. Every reason
urges its approval and adoption. The power to punish should be given to every
court and its exercise should be vigorous in every instance until this jeopardy to
fair trial is removed. The newspapers abound in criticism against lawyers because examinations of proposed jurors are lengthy in this country, while they are
brief in others. The fact is that the newspapers in this country do not want a
defendant tried. The newspapers claim the right to determine the case without
a trial. They do, to their own satisfaction, determine every case that attracts
publicity. In many instances they formulate, and in many they try to form, the
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opinion of the jury. And if perchance the jury does not pronounce the verdict
that they have insisted on, they shriek their abuse at the jurors. The newspapers
determined Samuel Insull's guilt. The jury sat, listened and decided. The presiding judge pronounced no criticism upon their conduct. The newspapers ridiculed and abused the men who decided as their conscience dictated, and are at this
moment demanding a further trial. The Hauptmann case which is now being
tried has been repeatedly decided by the newspapers. The juror in that case who
has not been made to believe that one cannot be righteous without voting for conviction must be indeed a rare individual. Despite the fact that for months the
defendant has been hounded by the press, that same press complains that it is
going to take days to select the jury when only the press is responsible for the
condition that will make that necessary. In no other country on the globe would
such conduct be permitted. To know the extent to which that is carried, particularly by the newspapers published in New York City, one need only to select any
case which attracted great publicity to see the outrageous misconduct of which
some newspapers were guilty. Nothing is done about it. Most judges seem to be
frightened and overawed by the so-called power of the press. One instance will
illustrate what some newspapers stand ready to do. In the case of the People v.
Charles H. Hyde, a lawyer of high repute, a member of one of the best and most
prominent law firms in the City of New York, appointed to the office of City
Chamberlain, was indicted. It was maintained by his counsel that the indictment
did not state a crime and that the facts set forth therein could, under no circumstances, constitute a crime. Decision upon that question was reserved throughout
the trial. There was no proof of the commission of any crime at the trial; but
an atmosphere had been created by the press which made positive the conviction
which was pronounced. On appeal, the indictment was dismissed first, because
it stated no crime, and second, because no evidence of the commission of any
crime was adduced. The fact that this man's reputation throughout the country
was destroyed, of course means nothing. But the iniquity of the freedom exercised by the press in publishing alleged proceedings before they take place is best
exemplified by what occurred in that particular case. The District Attorney
supplied the newspapers with a copy of his opening address to the jury. He,
however, misjudged the time when he was going to deliver it. Court adjourned
on the day that this speech was going to be made before the hour for the making
of the speech arrived. Nothing daunted, one of the papers, published in the
evening, saw fit not merely to publish the speech but to describe how the defendant squirmed before the jury and paled, and obviously gave evidence of his guilt
when he heard the bitter arraignment of the prosecutor. That was called to the
attention of the learned trial judge. He conceded that it should not have
occurred, but asked what could he do. Nothing was done. These same newspapers scream every day their denunciation upon New York lawyers and their
commendations of practitioners in London, the former for being so prolix, the
latter for being so brief in procuring a jury. Indeed, recently an article appeared
in which English judges were quoted as saying that challenges are most rare.
These same papers might investigate what English judges do to any newspaper
editor or publisher who dares to comment upon the effect of evidence already
given before a verdict is pronounced, let alone commenting upon the obvious
effect of a speech upon the jury when no such speech had been delivered. No
English judge would have said, it should not have happened. but what can one do.
The newspaper publisher and editor responsible would have been before the
judge on the following morning and would have been in jail that same afternoon.
That is why the power to punish for contempt should be given. Trial by newspaper must be abolished. A cowardly bar produces an equally cowardly bench.
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The bar can procure such legislation, despite the opposition of all the press, if it
makes a concerted effort, and it is to be hoped that if statute directed the punishment, that courts would exercise the power. I would recommend that it be made
a crime to publish proposed testimony before the trial to indicate the accused's
guilt or innocence, to publish comments on the testimony before a verdict is
given, and severe penalty should be imposed for the commission of the crime.
XVIII. Disposition of Cases by the Prosecuting Attorney: the Nolle Prosequi
and the Bargainedfor Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense
The Committee expresses great distrust of prosecutors. The belief is intimated that they accept pleas of lesser crimes because of carelessness or corruption.
It is a terrible thing to assume that it is generally true. Nevertheless, the Committee approves" the proposal as tending to a desirable end. If prosecutors are
generally negligent or corrupt, either or both, the adoption of the proposal would
not, in my opinion, tend to a desirable end. I prefer the adoption of the suggestion of the Committee which reads:
"More effective in this respect would be the exercise of a vigorous
supervision by the courts or by some administrative agency, created for that
purpose."
Indeed, it should be recommended and adopted that neither a plea to a lesser
crime nor a nolle prosequi should be accepted or made other than by order of the
judge presiding in the particular part to which the recommendation of the District
Attorney is addressed.
. XIX. The Administration of Bail
The recommendation of the Committee is well reasoned, concisely put and
should be adopted. Unfortunately, a few prosecutors and some judges feel that
the imposition of high bail is an indication on the part of the court that the
defendant is guilty, which will help the prosecution. If that is true, all the more
should it be avoided. As the Committee suggests, the question of bail should be
determined not by the particular type of crime but a consideration of the character
of the defendant, his past record, financial standing, etc. I do not so much care
about the financial standing as I do the consideration of the character of the
defendant, his past record, his surroundings. The likelihood of his absenting
himself from the trial may be somewhat determined by his circumstances. Is he
in a position readily to sever himself from his present relations and flee to foreign
parts? But, as the Committee says, it should be left in each case to the court's
discretion.
XX. The Enactment of a Federal Statute Regulating the Importation of
Firearms
XXI. The Establishment of a Federal Crime Bureau to Provide Uniform
Statistics for the Aid of State Legislatures
XXII. The Requirement That All Hospitals, Physicians, etc., Report Imnediately Cases of Injuries Due to Dangerous Weapons
Any measure calculated to aid the detection pr prevention of the commission
of crime should be enacted. These three provisions tend in that direction. The
Cormmittee has not considered them in the same manner that it did the nineteen
prior proposals. It indicates their importance in any well balanced comprehensive
scheme of procedural revision in the criminal law. I take it that the Committee
means that it favors the enactment of a federal statute, the creation of a federal
crime records bureau and the requirement with respect to hospitals, physicians,
etc. It has not considered the form. The proposals should be adopted.
Max D. Steuer.t
" Member of the New York Bar.
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THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT. By Edward S. Corwin. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1934. Pp. xxviii, 237. Price: $2.50.

A reviewer's conclusions about a book can no more escape a touch of color
from the reviewer himself than can a judgment about anything else. This will
be true of the reviewer's evaluation of both the author's workmanship and of
his ideas; to some extent even in a field like that of negotiable instruments, obviously far more in the less tightly bound considerations of constitutional theory
and constitutional law. It seems to me that this little book is a highly admirable
piece of work. It is a credit to its distinguished author and to American scholarship. It seems to be well written, careful in analysis, convincing in its conclusions. If there were a book of the year prize for legal writing and I had a
vote in its award, I should cast mine for Mr. Corwin as the 1934 candidate. On
the other hand, it is entirely possible that one who looks at the Constitution,
national policy and public welfare from a widely different point of view from
that of the author may find Mr. Corwin's discussion heretical and the conclusions
intolerable. If he does so find them, he will not be moved from his position by
shouts of acclaim for this book from the opposite camp. But such a reader will
be compelled to go through some intellectual, as well as emotional, uneasiness.
While the sum total of Mr. Corwin's pages is not large-indeed the whole book
would fit in an overcoat pocket-there is no wasted space or wasted words. It is
closely reasoned exposition, based upon a thorough knowledge both of case law
and the literature of constitutional theory and history. The language is clear,
the ideas are clear, and his conclusions are not to be shaken by unsupported denial
of their validity.
The Twilight of the Supreme Court contains the 1934 Storrs Lectures,
delivered by Mr. Corwin at the Yale Law School. The title is alluring but misleading. The author comes neither to praise nor to bury the Court, but to trace
and analyze our constitutional theory. That the Supreme Court is in twilight
need not be the conclusion; this very time may be the dawn of a golden age.
There are four divisions to the treatment. The first is dual federalism versus
nationalism; the second, property right versus legislative power; third, the government of laws, not man, theory; finally, the spending power. The outstanding
impression I got from the discussion in the first three divisions was that upon
most of the questions which can arise thereunder the Court is still free to decide
as its present judgment dictates. Then, in the introduction, which I read later,
Mr. Corwin puts the point tersely and clearly: "Its own freedom of decision is
the outstanding product of the Court's exercise of the power of judicial review."
The most exciting discussion is that on the spending power, where the constitutional theory governing the use of the taxpayer's money under the general welfare clause has had a minitrum of judicial restraint. One of the author's observations thereon has added interest because of legislative developments at this
very time. The vital question here, he says, is not judicial review, "but that of the
proper relationship of the executive and the legislature in this field of power".
All this is developed with sufficient fullness to establish the points, never to the
extent of over-elaboration or repetitions.
Professor Corwin's style makes good reading; not like a story in the Post,
but good straight-forward exposition which one can follow without difficulty if
he keeps his wits about him. The book is w.ell and attractively made. Its cost,
in present currency, is two and one-half dollars. It is a recommended investment
for lawyer or layman who seeks to understand what is happening to the Constitution in these stirring days.
HerbertF. Goodrich.t
t Dean of the Law School and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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(Revised Edition). By Nathan Isaacs.
Macmillan Co., New York, 1934. Pp. xxviii, 512. Price: $4.oo.
In the science and practice of business, a great many of the functions are
legal, and this is the reason and justification for including in the curriculum of a
business school the course in Business Law. The Business Law course is in
reality not a course in law at all, any more than a course in Production Management is of necessity a course in Engineering. It is a course in business in which
the activities of business are examined in relation to the rules of law which control
them.
The relations between law and business are obvious, although there is no
relation between law as taught in a law school and the manner in which it is
taught in a business school. Lawyers consider persons and things in the light of
abstract rights and duties, and ordinarily with the idea of restoring to a person.
something of which he has been deprived, or a damage in substitution for a performance of some promised advantage. This is law in judgment and'as remedy.
It is after the fact.
In Business Law, or the law as it relates to business, the man of commerce
has little interest in damages, in judgments, or in precise legal rights. He is
essentially interested in having his business return him a profit. He has little
need of lawyers, but he has a great need 'for the law. The principles of buying
and selling of goods are in great measure a matter of promised advantages and
payment. In fact, the whole business order rests on contract. Problems of
credit, commercial paper, security of transactions are all matters of law-law in
action or law in business practice.
It was Professor Nathan Isaacs, who in 1921 first clearly announced the
foundation postulates of law in business in his book, The Law in Business Problems. This book attracted wide attention and provoked great discussion. Earlier,
law was always examined methodically and under sections in a digest. It came
as a great -surprise, particularly to lawyers, to find this book sectionalized into
such groupings as "Engaging in Business," "Legal Status of Business," "Limitations on Trading," "Contracts in Relation to Buying and Selling, and Operation
in Business," "Contract in Relation to Creditor and Debtor," "Contract in Protecting and Facilitating Credit," and "Laws of Business Organization."
In this early book, Professor Isaacs placed emphasis on the function of the
law in the business transaction. He made a pattern of the processes of business
and indicated the place and function of law in it.
This past year he has offered a revision of the earlier work. In basic theory
it is the same book-the function of law in business-but in this later volume
there is a shift in emphasis. The original chapter on Engaging in Business is
now The Law of the Market. In it is a most complete analysis of the forces and
factors-economic, social, and legal-that find expression in the market place.
In the chapter on The Formation of Contracts, Professor' Isaacs examines
the greatest commercial device-the contract. In two very penetrating sections,
he shows the contract in legal principle, after which he traces it through all the
possibilities that may arise in business. The most valuable point in these two
sections is his clear demonstration that the substance and the operation of the
contract is a matter entirely within the province of the business.
One of the most valuable things in the book is the discussion of the relation
of business to government. Dr. Isaacs considers legislation as a source of the
law and also the problems of unfair competition and codes to regulate trading.
This phase of the work should have a strong appeal to the active man of business
as well as to the student, both of whom are wondering as to the result of the
"ship of state" overhauling the "privateers".
THE LAW IN BUSINESS PROBLEMS
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In the chapter on Credit,the most significant advances have been made. Of
all the subjects in modern business, credit is the least understood of any of the
practices, and with the present limitations that are imposed on banks, some of
the other possibilities this work suggests as to raising funds will prove helpful
and most valuable. Few merchants realize to the full all the possibilities of
credit.
In conclusion, reviewing a book is not a difficult task. All that is necessary
is to go through the text making such comments as please the writer. But to
attempt in a few comments to account for all the thought and experience that
has gone into this book surpasses the possibility of a few pages in a law review.
Dr. Isaacs has done a great deal more than write another book. He has given
the man of active affairs, and the student alike, a carefully worked out study of
a great subject. It has been done intelligently and brilliantly.
It is a good Scripture and possibly good reviewing to take the position "the
first shall be last". After having gone through the entire book and noticing at
all points the fine scholarship and effort, the reviewer was continually drawn
back to the introduction. It is not a bow for approval. It is a narrative-The
Purchase of an Automobile. In this opening, he explores all the relations and
factors--economic and legal-that enter into the transaction. It is a fitting introduction that genuinely introduces.
The entire work is sound, well done, and will be a substantial addition to
Dr. Isaacs's already well established reputation.
E. S. Wolaver.t
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW. By Justin Miller.
Paul, 1934. Pp. xiii, 649. Price: $5.0o.

West Publishing Co., St.

This is a 1934 Hornbook. However, it is not an altogether new treatise on
Criminal Law, but is, in the author's own words, "based on Mikell's Edition of
Clark's Criminal Law". That was the third edition of Clark, and so this may
properly be considered a revision of Clark, or the fourth edition. Perhaps it is
just as well that the dynasty is no longer continued, for Dean Miller's book is
a great improvement both in style and content, and takes its place among the
better Hornbooks.
In many instances paragraphs from Clark are taken over bodily, but generally there are additions and omissions, and very often the language is wholly
new and decidedly more satisfactory. The black letter approach is retained, but
in greatly modified form, with the resultant elimination of a great deal of needless
and deadly repetition. The main purpose of the book is, of course, to present
concisely the substantive law of crimes as expounded in the cases, but the author
fortunately does not hesitate to relieve the monotony by venturing to express his
own ideas with reference to the desirability of certain rules and proposed changes
therein, "particularly with reference to new concepts arising out of new economic
and social conditions."
Particularizing some of the representative improvements, we note that,
whereas under Misconduct in Office 1 Clark has six paragraphs in black print,
loosely arranged, followed by a discussion of all six in two paragraphs of regular
text, without division or caption of any kind, Miller's Misconduct in or Regarding
Public Office 2 has one brief black-letter paragraph which serves as an introduction to the six following paragraphs of regular text matter, each of which is
t Professor, School of Business Administration, University of Michigan.
. P. 450.
2. P. 475.
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properly captioned, as (a) Malfeasance, (b) Extortion, (c) Oppression, (d)
Fraud and Breach of Trust, (e) Nonfeasance, (f) Exceptions.
Another striking instance is Chapter 19, Offenses Against the Eristence of
Government.3 Here the treatment of Treason, Sedition, etc., is far more comprehensive and more satisfactory and contains several times as many citations in
the notes. Also, the anomalous inclusion of Forestalling, Regrating, and Engrossing by Clark in this chapter was avoided by Miller, who logically places
them with Monopolies,- Restraints of Trade, 4 etc.
It is interesting also to compare their treatment of State v. Scates.5 Speaking of a case where A mortally wounds C, and then, acting independently, B also
mortally wounds C, accelerating his death, Clark says: "In such case the person
who struck the first blow, though it would have resulted in death, is not liable for
the homicide." 6 He cites State v. Scates as authority without comment, following it up with an excerpt from People v. Lewis, 7 contra,but expresses no opinion

himself. Miller, on the other hand, after pointing out s the uncertainty in the
cases as to whether or not A is on such facts guilty of the homicide, and the
theory of the cases holding that he is not, quotes the following from State v.
Scates: "If one man inflicts a mortal wound, of which the victim is languishing,
and then a second kills the deceased by an independent act, we cannot imagine
how the first can be said to have killed him, without involving the absurdity of
saying that the deceased was killed twice." The author then adds: "Of course
the absurdity is that the judge can speak of a 'mortal wound' previously inflicted
and in the same .breath of another person killing the deceased 'by an independent
act'. If, in fact, the- first -wound was a mortal wound, then it would seem that it
must have been contributing to the death at the time of its occurrence. There is
no difficulty or absurdity involved in finding that the acts of both persons contributed to the death, and that both are guilty thereof, even though they were not
acting in concert. The better reasoned cases so hold." 9 He then cites, inter alia,
People ". Lewis in support of his position. This is not only a vast improvement
on Clark's treatment, but so far as this reviewer recalls, it is the best treatment
of this interesting case to be found in any book of similar scope.
The most noteworthy new features of Dean Miller's book are his fifteen-page
introductory chapter on "The Scope of Criminal Law, and Chapter Six, The
Criminal Act. The preface says: "An introductory chapter has been used to
indicate the wide scope of the criminal law in its larger aspects and an effort has
been made to suggest a variety of approaches to the administration of criminal
justice which my be used for its improvement." In addition to general statements therein concerning criminal law and procedure this chapter introduces such
matters as Probation, Parole, Pardon, Penology, juvenile Courts, Crime Prevention, etc., the text being richly garnished with notes containing citations of keynumber sections in the Decennial Digests, law review articles, books, surveys, etc.
The chapter on The Criinal Act contains five sections: 22-Generally; 23Causation and Criminal Law; 24-Sole Cause-Contributing Cause; 25-Intervening Acts; 26-Unintended Consequences; 27-The Corpus Delicti.
As suggested above, there is much reorganization and rearrangement throughout the book, with a great deal of new material added in many chapters. Perhaps
the most notable instance of re-grouping is the gathering and consolidating into
3. MIL.ER, . HANDBOOK OF CRIMIINAL LAW

(Mikell's ed.) c. 15, p. 469.
4. P..448, § 146.
5. 50 N. C. 420 (1858)
6. P. 17o.
7. 124 Cal. 5 I, 57 Pac. 470 (1899).
8. P. go.
9. Pp. o; 91.
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one chapter 10 of all the materials on Justification, scattered by Clark through
several different chapters. It includes sections 63-Generally; 64-Acts in Furtherance of Public justice; 65-Acts Done in Furtherance of Domestic Authority; 66-Justifiable and Excusable Self-Defense; 67-The Nature of SelfDefense; 68-Defense of Others; 69-Defense of Property; 7o-JustificationMiscellaneous; 71-Alibi. An instance of added material is the four-page treatment of Criminal Contempts 11 at the end of Chapter 17, Offenses Against Public
Justice and Authority.
There are 544 pages of Miller's text as against 503 in Clark's, and there
would seem to be about 15 or 2o per cent. more material on a page in Miller's
book. Also, the new book cites some six thousand cases, an increase of about 50
per cent. over the old. The notes are greatly improved, containing, besides the
vastly larger number of case citations (one might wish the dates of the cases
were included), references to other materials of many kinds. The author concludes his preface with this statement: "In view of the fact that it is designed
in part for use in law schools, generous use has been made, particularly by way
of citation, of material from the law reviews and journals." Judges and lawyers
may not relish the implication! The index is much fuller and more useful than
its predecessor, but, like most indexes, has faults of omission. For instance, the
so-called third degree methods of the police are discussed briefly but interestingly, 12 but one would at least have great difficulty in locating this matter by using
the index.
Remembering that this is a Hornbook, whose primary purpose is to present
a concise statement of the general principles of Criminal Law, the reviewer thinks
that Dean Miller has given us a very excellent and useful book, and would recommend it heartily to students for use in connection with their casebooks. Also,
it should prove a very good medium of instruction in schools where text-books
are used as the basis of class discussion. Lawyers and judges too should find it
refreshing and helpful, especially in view of the extensive and varied citations
and references in the notes.
Paul E. Bryan.t
PROCEDURE AND FORMS; COMMON LAW PLEADING.

By Roger O'Donnell. National Law Book Co., Washington, 1934. Pp. xlii, 459. Price: $5.50 .
The book is divided into two parts, the first of which consists of 284 pages.
More than a hundred of these deal with the common law forms of action. The
remainder of this portion treats the steps in pleading and the rules relating thereto,
with brief chapters on attachment and garnishment, and service and quashing of
process. Part two has 164 pages devoted to specimens of declarations, pleas,
demurrers, motions, etc., adopted from precedents in use in the District of
Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. There are separate indices for fhe two
divisions of the work.
In the preface the author pays tribute to Stephen but expresses the hope
that he can offer to American law students a less difficult text than the learned
Serjeant produced over a hundred years ago for use at Oxford. By the use of
simple language and blackletter paragraph guides, Mr. O'Donnell presents a
volume which is easier to read than that of his English predecessor. While he
has included considerable historical explanatory matter, he has certainly lived up
to his determination to omit much of the earlier background material found in
Stephen's work. This is a long way from saying that the result represents any
t Professor of Law, Lamar Law School,
Io. C. o.
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notable achievement. We have a right to expect that a text written today would
be greatly superior to Stephen's, not only because of the great advance of legalhistorical knowledge in the last century, but also on account of the more honest
and undogmatic modern approach to legal propositions.
One looks at the book under review in vain for signs of improvement in
either respect. Mr. O'Donnell delights in quoting Maitland to the effect that the
forms of action are still important, though they may have been abolished. However, in the main he neglects and, by his adherence to old-fashioned views, contradicts the discoveries of the great master of English legal history as well as the
contributions of Street, Ames, Woodbine, Plucknett and others. For example,
we find the following astounding statement at page IO: "At that time [1258] it

was not possible to obtain original writs except for the following actions: Account, Covenant, Debt, Detinue, Trespass and Replevin." I Again, the explanation of trespass as well as of the other damage actions suffers a great deal from
want of attention to Professor Woodbine's writings 2 on the subject. To mention but one more instance, we find the traditional theory of the origin of case
from chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster II (pp. I I, 12, 64, 66, 89) in spite
of the showing 3 by Professor Plucknett of the unsoundness of the old doctrine.
Omission of historical details may be permissible or even commendable but the
offering of discredited explanations, when the truth is readily available, seems
unfortunate indeed.
Other shortcomings of the book are the results of superficial or faulty
analysis of the materials considered. The statement (pp. 4, 5) that the si te
fecerit securum form of original writ was used in tort actions and the prcecipe
type in actions ex contractu is without excuse. Anyone who has examined the
writs would see at a glance that the prcecipe form was used in the older actions,
while the si te fecerit securum style was confined to trespass and its offshoots.
No practical reconciliation is attempted of the doctrines that time must be pleaded
and yet does not have to be proved as alleged (pp. 178-179). 4 The distinction
betiveen conclusions of law and facts (p. 199) could have been clarified by adoption of Professor Cook's explanation.,' The distinction between pleas by way of
excuse and by way of justification is made (p. 248), but there is no discussion
of any practical reason for the differentiation. The doctrine that pleas puis
darreign continuanwe constitute a waiver of other defenses is stated (pp. 253254), but the basis of the rule, viz., to facilitate the adjustment of costs, 6 is not
mentioned, and of course it is not pointed out that this rule is not applicable to
present American practices regarding costs. The foregoing are only a few examples of many similar defects occurring throughout the work.
For a modern student text, emphasis is frequently misplaced. More space
and prominence are given to new assignment (pp. 263-265) than to amendments
(pp. 212-214), though the situations formerly calling for the former can and
probably would be handled now by the much broader device of amendment.
Much attention is given to the special traverse (pp. 240-246), which even Stephen
called a relic in comparative disuse.7 Contrasting with this and immediately folI. Cf. 2 POLLOCK '& MAITLAND, HisTORy OF ENGLISH LAw (1895) 562, 563, declaring
that there were thirty or forty different forms of action and perhaps hundreds if minor
variations are counted.
2. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 799; (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 343.
3. Plucknett, Case and The Statute of Westminster I1 (193) 31 Col. L. REv. 778.
4. Cf. Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 487.
5. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes (1921) 21 Co. L. REV. 4x6.
6. Lyttleton v. Cross, 4 B. & C. 117 (1825); The Pemigewasset Bank v. Brackett, 4
N. H. 557 (1829).
7. However, the special traverse was used in Beatty v. Parsons, 25 Del. 134, 78 At. 302
(Super. Ct. igio). Cf. Beck v. Bethlehem Loading Co., 30 Del. 470, 1o8 At. 141 (Super.

Ct. i919), (discouraging this plea).
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lowing it, is the extremely brief treatment of plural pleas (pp. 246-248), with
no mention of the necessity of consistency thereof. In connection with trespass,
wergeld (p. 53) and the criminal aspects of the action (p. 53) are mentioned,
but not a single word is said concerning the necessity of a re-entry before recovery
for injuries to realty while in the adverse possession of a defendant. This is a
subject of present day importance even in a code state."
Finally, little attention is given to the growth of the law and to its changing
concepts. Common words such as pleading, appearance, and debt have had different meanings at different times. Mr. O'Donnell has often failed to take this
into account, but nowhere more than in his treatment of the forms of action. In
the main, he conveys the idea that the forms of actions are unchanged verities
which have come down from time of Moses (see p. 227 note), Anglo-Saxon
antiquity, the Conquest, or at the latest the date of the Statute of Westminster II.
Nothing is farther from the truth. Our history shows clearly the transition from
many forms of action to a comparative few with the survivors performing the
functions of the abandoned ones and with a constantly increasing overlapping
between those remaining in common use. This tendency has continued in America both with and without the aid of legislation. In a sense, the code abolishment
of the distinction between the forms of action was simply an abrupt change and
different only in degree from what the courts and the profession had been doing
gradually for centuries. In any Anglo-American system of procedure the real
and lasting importance of the forms of action is that they give us our substantive
law theories. Even when their use is preserved we do not need to go to the
extent of adhering to the "theory of the case" doctrine, which is so strongly
insisted upon by the author, and which he does not distinguish from the variance
difficulty or from the shift from one form of action to another.
Part II is definitely superior to the text material. The individual forms are
modem and yet are cast in the molds of the forms of action. While they are
taken from three middle Atlantic jurisdictions they could be used-with a little
modification--even in code jurisdictions. The collection is a well-rounded one
except that there is no declaration in trover. This section could be made more
valuable by specific citations from the text to particular forms rather than by the
general cross-references which are found at the bottom of each appropriate page
of the text.
The printing and binding of the book are excellent. There are a few typographical errors, the most serious of which are a persistent misspelling of pr~cipe
and reference to non-existent pages at pages 28o and 283. Sparkle is added by
occasional passages from Warren's Ten Thousand a Year. The work is lightly
documented. There is very little reference to text books and none at all to legal
periodicals. The footnotes consist very largely of quotations from, or summaries
of, about 250 opinions found in current case books on the subject.
While the author's statements are often accurate and at times particularly
lucid, the reviewer questions many other passages than those mentioned above.
Perhaps some of these objections might turn out to be groundless if citations had
been given for the various statements. At any rate this much can be said in
alleviation of this rather unfavorable review. The shortcomings of the work,
whether historical, analytical or of emphasis, are usually the traditional ones.
In some jurisdictions this book, inadequate though it seems, might be better
material for bar examination preparation than one closer to the heart's desire.
Thomas E. Atkinson.t
t Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Kansas.
8. Avery v. Spicer, 9o CQnn. 5A 98 Atl. 135 (19r6).

9. See
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